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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

REF: STATE 97473

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-015.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The second meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group was held at the U.S. Mission on September 25, 2009. U.S. and Russian Delegations exchanged questions regarding their respective approaches to organizing and reporting categories of data in the MOU. Questions were focused on understanding the objectives behind proposed categories of data and how each Party expected to use these categories for verification and transparency. The Russian Delegation also sought to clarify which limitations the United States intended to put on non-deployed systems. They also asked the U.S. side to examine the Russian proposal to introduce an aggregate limit of 600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM/SLBM launchers in order to provide balance and to limit upload capability. The Russian Delegation argued against unbalanced restrictions, particularly on road-mobile systems.

14. (S) The U.S. side clarified the U.S. position not to base ICBM or SLBM launchers outside U.S. national territory. The Delegation explained that the space launch facilities at Meck and Kodiak Islands would be used to launch space launch vehicles (SLVs) that incorporated the first stage of the Trident I SLBM and that the Trident I SLBM and Minuteman II ICBM would not be counted under the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty. Russia clarified that, under their proposal, data on existing types, variants, and versions of systems will continue to be reported with the exception of support equipment. The U.S. side also pressed Russia to rethink the Russian position not to list space launch facilities in Kazakhstan in the MOU. The Russian Delegation admitted they may need to be more specific in defining at what point a missile removed from a launcher for maintenance would be counted as non-deployed.

THE THROW-WEIGHT DEBATE

15. (S) General Orlov began opening remarks and explained that the Russian Delegation had analyzed the U.S.-proposed MOU to compare commonalities in each Party's approach. He said Russia needed clarification on a number of issues to thoroughly understand U.S. proposed categories of data. Orlov explained that Russia needed to understand the objective of the U.S. approach and definitions in order to find common ground and ultimately develop an MOU. He said the Russians had prepared 12 questions for discussion.

16. (S) Orlov questioned U.S. intentions to report throw-weight in the MOU, inquiring why the United States planned to add a parameter on a subject not limited by the treaty while also stating that throw-weight provisions which pertained to heavy ICBMs would no longer apply. Mr. Trout reminded the Russian Delegation that throw-weight remains a factor in determining new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in the U.S. proposal. Trout explained that the U.S. definition of new type was taken from START and includes throw-weight, since it is a measure to determine a new type of missile in comparison to an existing type. Orlov argued that the Russian treaty proposal does not include provisions on exchanging telemetry; therefore, there would be no verification of throw-weight data. Trout acknowledged the point, but explained that the U.S proposal does include telemetry exchanges.

17. (S) General Poznihir stated that the Parties are discussing a treaty based on counting warheads deployed on delivery vehicles regardless of whether they are existing types or new types. Therefore, the Russian opinion is that throw-weight does not play a role. Trout responded that, in order to add transparency, we need to determine the maximum number of warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs. Poznihir argued that the goal is to verify operationally-deployed warheads, not the maximum number on each missile. Trout agreed that determining the number of operationally-deployed warheads is one factor of verification, but the United States had adopted certain START methodologies to maintain transparency as well. Providing this data would aid each side in understanding the other Party's force, while allowing each Party to determine the composition of its own force. The U.S proposal was not just to verify the number of deployed warheads, but also to provide an additional level of transparency. Trout said the Russian focus was on verifying numbers of limited items but commented that the item and the number of items to be limited would be decided at senior levels.

18. (S) Orlov requested clarification to confirm that the U.S. purpose of listing throw-weight in the MOU was related to transparency. Trout confirmed. Orlov asked whether the addition of throw-weight was intended as a provision to monitor all missiles or just the development of new types. Trout confirmed that the goal was transparency and to provide a better understanding of new types.

AGGREGATE LIMITS AND
UPLOAD CAPABILITY

¶9. (S) Poznihir stated that the United States intended to conduct inspections on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs but did not provide definitions or an aggregate limit on those systems. He asked which data the United States planned to use to verify numbers on non-deployed systems. Trout responded that the United States had definitions for non-deployed systems in the U.S. proposal. Poznihir inquired as to whether the United States would be willing to introduce aggregate limits on deployed and non-deployed systems and add them to the aggregate numbers section of the MOU. Trout responded that we have such limits for mobile non-deployed systems, but the United States would consider the suggestion.

Colonel Petrov explained that such data is required under START to verify the number of non-deployed systems associated with each facility. Lieutenant Lobner explained that the United States proposed to include data on non-deployed systems in the aggregate section for each Party, similar to START.

¶10. (S) Colonel Pischulov asked for the U.S. opinion on the Russian-proposed concept of introducing an aggregate limit of 600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Trout responded that the United States had only recently received the Russian proposal and the United States still needed time for review, but it was studying the option in the context of the on-going Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

¶11. (S) Pischulov stated that the proposed aggregate limit of 600 on ICBM and SLBM launchers would provide transparency and allow the sides to control upload potential. When asked to explain, Poznihir stated that it would be unfair if one side has 600 launchers and the other 2000. He opined that one side could have non-deployed missiles and warheads in storage that could be used to upload and, therefore, create unfair conditions. Poznihir asked whether the United States envisioned limits on the number of non-deployed launchers. Trout responded that the United States' concerns over upload capability were based on warheads and not delivery vehicles. Orlov responded that warheads cannot fly without a delivery vehicle. He stated that there was a huge gap in the number of proposed numerical limits on delivery vehicles, citing the 500-1100 proposed limits on delivery vehicles. Orlov asked what could be done to narrow the gap. Trout cited that the United States had spoken to the Russians about proposing lower limits on delivery vehicles to a range of 700-900 but Orlov said that Russia did not receive an official proposal in writing. The reason, Trout responded, was that there were other conditions that had not been agreed to by Russia. Orlov agreed.

¶12. (S) Orlov asked how deployed versus non-deployed SLBMs would be reported. Trout responded that they would be reported as they currently were under START. Petrov asked whether the United States planned to indicate specifically which SLBMs were deployed and which were non-deployed in storage bunkers prior to each inspection. Trout answered that the process for reporting during inspections is a question for the Inspection Protocol Working Group, but that information would be included in the MOU for each base similar to START.

MOBILE RESTRICTIONS --
AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

¶13. (S) Orlov questioned U.S. rationale for continuing to insist on unique identifiers (UIDs) which were applied only to mobile ICBMs, and why the general U.S. focus was specifically on mobile ICBM forces. Orlov asked for clarification as to why this was necessary. Trout emphasized

the historical background of mobile missiles explaining that, during original START negotiations, both sides agreed that the most difficult strategic offensive arms (SOAs) to monitor were mobile missiles. Therefore, additional procedures were

agreed upon by both Parties to deal with these concerns. Trout explained that Russia agreed to these measures even after the United States cancelled its plans for developing and deploying mobile missiles. Orlov replied that these restrictions only affected Russia. Trout replied that Russia still has mobile missiles; therefore, the additional procedures were still required. Trout concluded that the discussion was above the level of the MOU WG.

¶14. (S) Poznihir said that the Russian proposal is to limit SOAs and did not see a reason to accept restrictions that only affect Russia. He stated that the covertness of submarines is more worrisome than that of mobile ICBMs. He opined that UIDs could therefore be applied to SLBMs. Poznihir also suggested defining operational zones at sea for submarines with SLBMs. Trout offered that a captain at sea might have a hard time dealing with restrictions on operational zones. After Orlov pressed the U.S. side for an answer, Trout responded by asking whether Russia was proposing UIDs for SLBMs. Orlov said they would think about it.

¶15. (S) Orlov stated again that the U.S. proposal would only be applied to mobile ICBM systems. Trout repeated that both countries had already agreed to additional measures under START, and asked what had changed. Orlov answered that the people at the table have changed. Mr. Luchaninov said that the original START negotiations were the first time these issues were discussed and 15 years have passed. Russia has had time to correct its position and concluded that monitoring SLBMs is much more difficult than monitoring mobile ICBMs. Luchaninov expressed surprise at what he called an unbalanced and inconsistent U.S. approach to controlling various types of strategic nuclear arms.

¶16. (S) Orlov said Russia needed to understand the U.S. goal behind maintaining the practice of reporting UIDs. He said that Russia is absolutely opposed to unbalanced restrictions on mobile systems and added that Russia does not bother U.S. submarines. Trout replied that the United States was not intending to control Russian mobiles or impose limitations on Russian road-mobile systems, but wanted to maintain transparency. He stated that mobile launchers can be reloaded more quickly than silo launchers or submarines. Orlov responded jocularly that maybe the United States should develop mobiles and see for themselves. Trout said the concern is related to having more missiles than launchers. As such, there needed to be an understanding regarding the total number of missiles in relation to launchers. Orlov said that such information would be provided in the aggregate numbers section of the MOU. Trout argued that UIDs are more helpful in tracking missiles after they leave the production facility. Poznihir said that Votkinsk would not be part of SFO. Orlov said that Russia had a secret: portal monitoring activities would not be continued.

¶17. (S) After a short break, Luchaninov again asked for clarification of U.S.-proposed limitations on non-deployed SLBMs and ICBMs, specifically, locational restrictions in Article IV of the U.S.-proposed treaty. Trout reminded the Russian Delegation that the sides had been discussing this issue since spring. The issue concerned the ability of mobile forces to rapidly expand. He stated that the U.S.

side was proposing no limits except the 80 for non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers, 10 for test mobile ICBM launchers, and 10 for mobile training launchers of ICBMs. He stated that the U.S. side would examine the Russian proposal to limit both deployed and non-deployed launchers.

¶18. (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether the United States would deploy ICBM/SLBM launchers or ICBMs/SLBMs themselves outside of national territory, including those used for space launch, and if there would be notifications for the associated activities. Lobner explained that the United States had no plans to base U.S. SLBMs, ICBMs, or launchers for ICBMs or SLBMs outside the national territory. Petrov asked whether the United States planned to send notifications regarding activities at Meck Island, noting that an SLV using the first stage of a Trident I SLBM had been used to launch a payload into space. Lobner replied that SLVs that incorporated the first stage of Trident I missiles could be launched from Kodiak and Meck Islands, but added that, in the U.S. proposal, the Trident I SLBM is not accountable and would not be declared.

¶19. (S) Petrov asked whether the Trident I and Minuteman II storage facilities would be accountable under SFO. Trout responded that they would not be accountable because they would not be declared as existing types of SLBMs/ICBMs in the U.S.-proposed treaty language. Therefore, their storage facilities would not be listed in the MOU.

LAST QUESTION, HEAVY BOMBERS

¶20. (S) Poznihir requested clarification of additional technical information in Annex F. Trout clarified that additional information in Annex F was information transferred from JCIC Agreement 23. Poznihir asked why additional technical information was being added for ICBMs and SLBMs but being deleted for heavy bombers. Lobner explained that the technical data listed under START was needed for verifying heavy bomber maximum equipage and types. Since the new treaty would only focus on distinguishing between different bomber types or variants of a type, but not between categories of bombers, such as those equipped for Long-Range Nuclear AlCMs or those equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, the additional data was no longer required.

¶21. (S) The Russians asked what types of ICBMs and SLBMs the U.S. proposed providing technical data. Trout stated that data would be provided for types declared under the treaty and, therefore, in response to further Russian questioning, technical data would not be provided for Trident I and Minuteman II, nor would their facilities be subject to inspections.

THE U.S. PUTS

RUSSIA ON THE STAND

¶22. (S) Trout began the U.S. questions noting that, in Section III of the Russian proposed MOU, there was a category of Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers. He noted that, under Russian-proposed counting rules, nuclear armaments on heavy bombers would only count when they are actually loaded on the bomber. Trout asked when this number would be anything other than zero, given that both Parties do not fly their bombers with nuclear armaments. Petrov responded that this category is based on a theoretical situation where a heavy bomber would be loaded with nuclear armaments on the airfield. He clarified that in this situation a notification would be sent or the information would be reported during pre-inspection procedures. Poznihir agreed that the number for heavy bombers would always be zero. Trout replied that if we had anything other than zero, each Party would have other concerns than complying with treaty provisions. Trout added that the United States had very significant concerns over

this proposed counting method.

¶23. (S) Trout asked the Russian Delegation if Russia planned to list the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) as an accountable item in the MOU since it was not listed in the Russian-proposed treaty. Orlov confirmed that Russia was just checking if the United States was paying attention to detail. When Trout asked about the RS-24, Orlov responded that, as of yet, there is no such thing.

¶24. (S) Mr. DeNinno asked which types of systems Russia intended to list in the MOU by type, variant, and version. He specifically asked whether Russia planned to provide information on fixed structures for mobile launchers. Orlov stated that the Russian answer would be an incomplete one. Poznihir responded that all current START information would be reported including all types and variants, with the exception of throw-weight and warhead attribution, emphasizing that Russia would not try to hide. Deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and launchers, including those designed for test and static displays, would also be included. DeNinno asked for confirmation that fixed structures would be listed. Petrov responded that the Russian-proposed definition annex does not include the term for support equipment. Fixed structures will therefore be considered normal structures and no technical data will be reported on them.

¶25. (S) DeNinno referenced Article V, Paragraph 3, of the Russian treaty text, where the Russian Federation proposed that "training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at ICBM bases and test ranges." He asked whether the Russian Federation envisioned declaring the number and location of training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs or mobile training launchers of ICBMs in the MOU. Poznihir responded that training launchers would be included in aggregate numbers and that Russia would provide aggregates numbers of deployed and non-deployed for each base.

WAIT, KAZAKHSTAN
IS NOT IN RUSSIA

¶26. (S) Lobner said that in Article VII, Paragraph 3, of the Russian-proposed treaty, the Russian Federation proposed that "each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a payload into space." He asked whether the Russian Federation envisioned declaring space launch facilities. He added that if such a facility is not declared, did Russia intend to locate an ICBM or SLBM at a facility not listed in the MOU. He asked about the planned status of the Leninsk Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan and if SLBMs, and their first stages used for space launch, would be accountable in the same way as under START. Petrov responded that, under existing START practices, an existing ICBM or SLBM could be used to deliver payloads that are not weapons into space. He said that Russia would provide the corresponding notifications if such launches occurred from test or space launch facilities.

¶27. (S) Lobner asked whether there would be a listing of these facilities in the MOU, specifically Leninsk. Shevchenko answered that SFO would not impose limits on existing patterns of cooperation with third parties, including activities at Baykonur (Leninsk), Kazakhstan. However, he continued, Russia had a presence at Leninsk and leased the facility from Kazakhstan. Trout asked about the status of treaty-accountable items shipped to Leninsk. Petrov responded that it would be the same as U.S. Trident II SLBMs transferred to the United Kingdom (UK) for their use on their submarines.

¶28. (S) Petrov and Orlov clarified that Russian missiles would not be transferred to a third party since the missiles would always be under Russian control. He repeated that

Leninsk was being leased by Russia. Trout asked again how this would be notified. Petrov responded that the United States would be notified just as the United States notifies Russia of Trident II transfers to the UK. Trout said there is a difference in these practices. In the U.S. view, missiles that are transferred to the UK become the property of the UK, but the missiles Russia locates to Kazakhstan are still Russian missiles.

¶29. (S) Shevchenko said accountable items would not be based at those facilities, only temporarily located. There is no prohibition against using the missiles for space launch and they would not be equipped with deployed warheads. DeNinno asked the Russian Delegation whether they were speaking of activities at the Leninsk test range or the space launch facility because different provisions apply to those facilities. Petrov clarified he was speaking of activities at the space launch facility. Trout asked how activities would be notified concerning the test range. Petrov said they would have to think about it. Petrov said all appropriate notifications would be sent. DeNinno explained that if Russia were to transfer a missile to another Russian facility, then the notification should include the name of the facility where it was located. Facilities where items could be located are listed in the MOU so that the sides are able to monitor and track missile movements. As such, space launch facilities still needed to be listed. Orlov said they would need to think about listing it in the MOU.

WE NEED MORE DETAILS

¶30. (S) Lobner noted that, in Annex C of the Russian MOU, the Russian Federation proposed that long-range nuclear ALCM technical data would be exchanged. He asked whether the Russian Federation envisioned exchanging data regarding other types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, for example, nuclear bombs, and nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers. Petrov responded that Russia does not have that problem as all Russian heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (LRNA). Therefore, the problem pertains only to U.S. systems. Petrov said Russia understood that, without such information, inspections at certain facilities would be difficult.

¶31. (S) DeNinno asked whether Russia planned to list coordinates for individual silo launchers or restricted areas for mobile launchers in the MOU, and added that this information was necessary to conduct nuclear warhead inspections. Petrov confirmed this and said that coordinates for each silo would be listed in Section II of the Russian proposal. He clarified that information on the aggregate number of warheads at the base and numbers of warheads deployed on each ICBM or SLBM would be reported at the base prior to the inspection.

¶32. (S) Mr. Sims asked whether Russia planned to list points of entry in the MOU. Petrov confirmed that Russia planned to provide all information associated with points of entry as currently provided under START. Flight routes would be provided in the Russian-proposed Annex D under additional data required.

DEFINE DEPLOYED VS.
NON-DEPLOYED

¶33. (S) Sims asked how a missile would be counted if all the warheads were removed but the missile remained in its launcher. Poznihir responded that it would count as deployed.

¶34. (S) Mr. Rust asked how Russia would count a missile that was only temporarily removed from a launcher for maintenance.

Additionally, he asked if Russia would notify the United States if a launcher was removed for a short period. Orlov said a missile removed from a launcher would count as non-deployed and that Russia would send a notification as a transparency measure. He agreed, however, that the issue of time does raise some questions and that a reasonable time limit would need to be determined.

¶35. (S) Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify whether they envisioned sending a notification each time an ICBM or SLBM was removed from a launcher or the number of warheads on an ICBM or SLBM was altered. Petrov stated that such a notification would have to be sent unless it was for a short period of time. Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify what was meant by a short period of time. Petrov stated that they would have to think about that concept and the corresponding notification requirement some more.

¶36. (S) Trout, in reference to Article III.4.(e).(ii) of the Russian-proposed treaty, asked why a mobile launcher that returned to a production facility would no longer count under the aggregate limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers. Orlov responded that if a mobile launcher returns to the production facility it meant there was a malfunction that rendered the launcher incapable of completing its mission. It was Russia's opinion that only operationally-capable launchers were located at ICBM bases or storage facilities. Once a mobile launcher left a production facility it would be accountable again. Colonel Hartford reasoned that, according to Russia's logic, if a launcher was not capable of fulfilling its intended purpose, then it would not be considered deployed. Orlov responded that mobile launchers would be considered deployed until the moment they reached the production facility. While at a base, however, mobile launchers would be considered to be deployed, regardless of their capability to carry out their mission.

¶37. (S) Orlov and Trout then discussed the path forward and the schedule for the next week. Trout noted that the United States would likely have a few more questions and that the two sides needed to begin work towards a Joint Draft Text. Orlov agreed and added that they needed to focus on Annexes A and B. Trout replied that the United States was still finalizing those Annexes. Orlov then recommended that the Parties focus on the organizational structure of the MOU, to which Trout agreed.

¶38. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶39. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Evans
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Luchaninov
Gen Poznihir
Col Petrov
Col Pischulov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

40. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS